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Abstract
We consider a multi-player stochastic differential game with linear McKean-Vlasov dynamics
and quadratic cost functional depending on the variance and mean of the state and control
actions of the players in open-loop form. Finite and infinite horizon problems with possibly some
random coefficients as well as common noise are addressed. We propose a simple direct approach
based on weak martingale optimality principle together with a fixed point argument in the
space of controls for solving this game problem. The Nash equilibria are characterized in terms
of systems of Riccati ordinary differential equations and linear mean-field backward stochastic
differential equations: existence and uniqueness conditions are provided for such systems. Finally,
we illustrate our results on a toy example.
MSC Classification: 49N10, 49L20, 91A13.
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1 Introduction
1.1 General introduction-Motivation
The study of large population of interacting individuals (agents, computers, firms) is a central issue
in many fields of science, and finds numerous relevant applications in economics/finance (systemic
risk with financial entities strongly interconnected), sociology (regulation of a crowd motion, herding
behavior, social networks), physics, biology, or electrical engineering (telecommunication). Ratio-
nality in the behavior of the population is a natural requirement, especially in social sciences, and is
addressed by including individual decisions, where each individual optimizes some criterion, e.g. an
investor maximizes her/his wealth, a firm chooses how much to produce outputs (goods, electricity,
etc) or post advertising for a large population. The criterion and optimal decision of each individual
depend on the others and affect the whole group, and one is then typically looking for an equilibrium
among the population where the dynamics of the system evolves endogenously as a consequence of
the optimal choices made by each individual. When the number of indistinguishable agents in the
population tend to infinity, and by considering cooperation between the agents, we are reduced in
the asymptotic formulation to a McKean-Vlasov (McKV) control problem where the dynamics and
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the cost functional depend upon the law of the stochastic process. This corresponds to a Pareto-
optimum where a social planner/influencer decides of the strategies for each individual. The theory
of McKV control problems, also called mean-field type control, has generated recent advances in the
literature, either by the maximum principle [5], or the dynamic programming approach [14], see also
the recent books [3] and [6], and the references therein, and linear quadratic (LQ) models provide
an important class of solvable applications studied in many papers, see, e.g., [15], [11], [10], [2].
In this paper, we consider multi-player stochastic differential games for McKean-Vlasov dyna-
mics. This corresponds and is motivated by the competitive interaction of multi-population with a
large number of indistinguishable agents. In this context, we are then looking for a Nash equilibrium
among the multi-class of populations. Such problem, sometimes refereed to as mean-field-type game,
allows to incorporate competition and heterogeneity in the population, and is a natural extension of
McKean-Vlasov (or mean-field-type) control by including multiple decision makers. It finds natural
applications in engineering, power systems, social sciences and cybersecurity, and has attracted
recent attention in the literature, see, e.g., [1], [7], [8], [4]. We focus more specifically on the case
of linear McKean-Vlasov dynamics and quadratic cost functional for each player (social planner).
Linear Quadratic McKean-Vlasov stochastic differential game has been studied in [9] for a one-
dimensional state process, and by restricting to closed-loop control. Here, we consider both finite
and infinite horizon problems in a multi-dimensional framework, with random coefficients for the
affine terms of the McKean-Vlasov dynamics and random coefficients for the linear terms of the cost
functional. Moreover, controls of each player are in open-loop form. Our main contribution is to
provide a simple and direct approach based on weak martingale optimality principle developed in [2]
for McKean-Vlasov control problem, and that we extend to the stochastic differential game, together
with a fixed point argument in the space of open-loop controls, for finding a Nash equilibrium.
The key point is to find a suitable ansatz for determining the fixed point corresponding to the
Nash equilibria that we characterize explicitly in terms of systems of Riccati ordinary differential
equations and linear mean-field backward stochastic differential equations: existence and uniqueness
conditions are provided for such systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We continue Section 1 by formulating the Nash
equilibrium problem in the linear quadratic McKean-Vlasov finite horizon framework, and by giving
some notations and assumptions. Section 2 presents the verification lemma based on weak sub-
martingale optimality principle for finding a Nash equilibrium, and details each step of the method
to compute a Nash equilibrium. We give some extensions in Section 3 to the case of infinite horizon
and common noise. Finally, we illustrate our results in Section 4 on some toy example.
1.2 Problem formulation
Let T > 0 be a finite given horizon. Let (Ω,F,F,P) be a fixed filtered probability space where
F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is the natural filtration of a real Brownian motion W = (Wt)t∈[0,T ]. In this section,
for simplicity, we deal with the case of a single real-valued Brownian motion, and the case of multiple
Brownian motions will be addressed later in Section 3. We consider a multi-player game with n
players, and define the set of admissible controls for each player i ∈ J1, nK as:
Ai =
{
αi : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rdi s.t. αi is F-adapted and
∫ T
0
e−ρtE[|αi,t|2]dt <∞
}
,
where ρ is a nonnegative constant discount factor. We denote by A = A1 × ... × An, and for any
α = (α1, ..., αn) ∈ A, i ∈ J1, nK, we set α−i = (α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αn) ∈ A−i = A1× . . .×Ai−1×
Ai+1 × . . .×An.
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Given a square integrable measurable random variable X0 and control α = (α1, ..., αn) ∈ A, we
consider the controlled linear mean-field stochastic differential equation in Rd:{
dXt = b(t,X
α
t ,E [X
α
t ] ,αt,E [αt])dt+ σ(t,X
α
t ,E [X
α
t ] ,αt,E [αt])dWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Xα0 = X0,
(1)
where for t ∈ [0, T ], x, x ∈ Rd, ai, ai ∈ Rdi :
b(t, x, x,α,α) = βt + bx,tx+ b˜x,tx+
∑n
i=1 bi,tαi + b˜i,tαi
= βt + bx,tx+ b˜x,tx+Btα+ B˜tα
σ(t, x, x,α,α) = γt + σx,tx+ σ˜x,tx+
∑n
i=1 σi,tαi + σ˜i,tαi
= γt + σx,tx+ σ˜x,tx+ Σtα+ Σ˜tα.
(2)
Here all the coefficients are deterministic matrix-valued processes except β and σ which are vector-
valued F-progressively measurable processes.
The goal of each player i ∈ J1, nK during the game is to minimize her cost functional over αi ∈
Ai, given the actions α−i of the other players:
J i(αi, α
−i) = E
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρtf i(t,Xαt ,E [X
α
t ] ,αt,E [αt])dt+ g
i(XαT ,E[X
α
T ])
]
,
V i(α−i) = inf
αi∈Ai
J i(αi, α
−i),
where for each t ∈ [0, T ], x, x ∈ Rd, ai, ai ∈ Rdi , we have set the running cost and terminal cost for
each player:
f i(t, x, x,a,a) = (x− x)ᵀQit(x− x) + xᵀ[Qit + Q˜it]x
+
∑n
k=1 a
ᵀ
kI
i
k,t(x− x) + aᵀk(Iik,t + I˜ik,t)x
+
∑n
k=1(ak − ak)ᵀN ik,t(ak − ak) + ak(N ik,t + N˜ ik,t)ak
+
∑
0≤k 6=l≤n(ak − ak)ᵀGik,l,t(al − al) + aᵀk(Gik,l,t + G˜ik,l,t)al
+2[LiTx,tx+
∑n
k=1 L
iᵀ
k,tak]
gi(x, x) = (x− x)ᵀP i(x− x) + x(P i + P˜ i)x+ 2riᵀx.
(3)
Here all the coefficients are deterministic matrix-valued processes, except Lix, Lik, r
i which are vector-
valued F-progressively measurable processes, and ᵀ denotes the transpose of a vector or matrix.
We say that α∗ = (α∗1, ..., α∗n) ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium if for any i ∈ J1, nK,
J i(α∗) ≤ J i(αi, α∗,−i), ∀αi ∈ Ai, i.e. , J i(α∗) = V i(α∗,−i).
As it is well-known, the search for a Nash equilibrium can be formulated as a fixed point problem as
follows: first, each player i has to compute its best response given the controls of the other players:
α?i = BRi(α
−i), where BRi is the best response function defined (when it exists) as:
BRi : A
−i → Ai
α−i 7→ argmin
α∈Ai
J i(α, α−i).
Then, in order to ensure that (α?1, ..., α?n) is a Nash equilibrium, we have to check that this candidate
verifies the fixed point equation: (α?1, ..., α?i ) = BR(α
?
1, ..., α
?
i ) where BR := (BR1, ...BRn).
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The main goal of this paper is to state a general martingale optimality principle for the search of
Nash equilibria and to apply it to the linear quadratic case. We first obtain best response functions
(or optimal control of each agent conditioned to the control of the others) of each player i of the
following form:
αi,t = −(Sii,t)−1U ii,t(Xt − E[Xt])− (Sii,t)−1(ξii,t − ξii,t)− (Sˆii,t)−1(V ii,tE[Xt] +Oii,t)
where the coefficients in the r.h.s., defined in (5) and (6), depend on the actions α−i of the other
players. We then proceed to a fixed point search for best response function in order to exhibit a
Nash equilibrium that is described in Theorem 2.3.
1.3 Notations and Assumptions
Given a normed space (K, |.|), and for T ∈ R?+, we set:
L∞([0, T ],K) =
{
φ : [0, T ]→ K s.t. φ is measurable and sup
t∈[0,T ]
|φt| <∞
}
L2([0, T ],K) =
{
φ : [0, T ]→ K s.t. φ is measurable and
∫ T
0
e−ρu|φt|2du <∞
}
L2FT (K) =
{
φ : Ω→ K s.t. φ is FT -measurable and E[|φ|2] <∞
}
S2F(Ω× [0, T ],K) =
{
φ : Ω× [0, T ]→ K s.t. φ is F-adapted and E[ sup
t∈[0,T ]
|φt|2] <∞
}
L2F(Ω× [0, T ],K) =
{
φ : Ω× [0, T ]→ K s.t. φ is F-adapted and
∫ T
0
e−ρuE[|φu|2]du <∞
}
.
Note that when we will tackle the infinite horizon case we will set T = ∞. To make the notations
less cluttered, we sometimes denote X = Xα when there is no ambiguity. If C and C˜ are coefficients
of our model, either in the dynamics or in a cost function, we note: Cˆ = C + C˜. Given a random
variable Z with a first moment, we denote by Z = E[Z]. For M ∈ Rn×n and X ∈ Rn, we denote by
M.X⊗2 = XᵀMX ∈ R. We denote by Sd the set of symmetric d× d matrices and by Sd+ the subset
of non-negative symmetric matrices.
Let us now detail here the assumptions on the coefficients.
(H1) The coefficients in the dynamics (2) satisfy:
a) β, γ ∈ L2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rd)
b) bx, b˜x, σx, σ˜x ∈ L∞([0, T ],Rd×d); bi, b˜i, σi, σ˜i ∈ L∞([0, T ],Rd×di)
(H2) The coefficients of the cost functional (3) satisfy:
a) Qi, Q˜i ∈ L∞([0, T ],Sd+), P i, P˜ i ∈ Sd, N ik, N˜ ik ∈ L∞([0, T ],Sdk+ ), Iik, I˜ik ∈ L∞([0, T ],Rdk×d)
b) Lix ∈ L2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rd), Lik ∈ L2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rdk), ri ∈ L2FT (Rd)
c) ∃δ > 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ]:
N ii,t ≥ δIdk P i ≥ 0 Qit − Iiᵀi,t(N ii,t)−1Iii,t ≥ 0
d) ∃δ > 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ]:
Nˆ ii,t ≥ δIdk Pˆ i ≥ 0 Qˆit − Iˆiᵀi,t(Nˆ ii,t)−1Iˆii,t ≥ 0.
Under the above conditions, we easily derive some standard estimates on the mean-field SDE:
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- By (H1) there exists a unique strong solution to the mean-field SDE (1), which verifies:
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xαt |2
]
≤ Cα(1 + E(|X0|2)) <∞ (4)
where Cα is a constant which depending on α only through
∫ T
0 e
−ρtE[|αt|2]dt.
- By (H2) and (4) we have:
J i(α) ∈ R for each α ∈ A,
which means that the optimisation problem is well defined for each player.
2 A Weak submartingale optimality principle to compute a Nash-
equilibrium
2.1 A verification Lemma
We first present the lemma on which the method is based.
Lemma 2.1 (Weak submartingale optimality principle). Suppose there exists a couple
(α?, (W.,i)i∈J1,nK), where α? ∈ A and W.,i = {Wα,it , t ∈ [0, T ],α ∈ A} is a family of adapted
processes indexed by A for each i ∈ J1, nK, such that:
(i) For every α ∈ A, E[Wα,i0 ] is independent of the control αi ∈ Ai;
(ii) For every α ∈ A, E[Wα,iT ] = E[gi(XαT ,PXαT )];
(iii) For every α ∈ A, the map t ∈ [0, T ] 7→ E[Sα,it ], with
S
α,i
t = e
−ρtWα,it +
∫ t
0 e
−ρuf i(u,Xαu ,PXαu ,αu,Pαu)du is well defined and non-decreasing;
(iv) The map t 7→ E[Sα?,it ] is constant for every t ∈ [0, T ];
Then α? is a Nash equilibrium and J i(α?) = E[Wα
?,i
0 ]. Moreover, any other Nash-equilibrium α˜
such that E[Wα˜,i0 ] = E[W
α?,i
0 ] and J
i(α˜) = J i(α?) for any i ∈ J1, nK satisfies the condition (iv).
Proof. Let i ∈ J1, nK and αi ∈ Ai. From (ii) we have immediately J i(α) = E [SαT ] for any α ∈ A.
We then have:
E[W(αi,α?,−i),i0 ] = E[S
(αi,α
?,−i),i
0 ]
≤ E[S(αi,α?−i),iT ] = J i(αi,α?,−i).
Moreover for αi = α?i we have:
E[W
(α?i ,α
?,−i),i
0 ] = E[S
(α?i ,α
?,−i),i
0 ]
= E[S(αi,α
?,−i),i
T ] = J
i(α?i ,α
?,−i),
which proves that α? is a Nash equilibrium and J i(α?) = E[Wα
?,i
0 ]. Finally, let us suppose that
α˜ ∈ A is another Nash equilibrium such that E[Wα˜,i0 ] = E[Wα
?,i
0 ] and J
i(α˜) = J i(α?) for any
i ∈ J1, nK. Then, for i ∈ J1, nK we have:
E[Sα˜,i0 ] = E[W
α˜,i
0 ] = E[W
α?,i
0 ] = E[S
α?,i
T ] = J
i(α?) = J i(α˜) = E[Sα˜,iT ].
Since t 7→ E[Sα˜,it ] is nondecreasing for every i ∈ J1, nK, this implies that the map is actually constant
and (iv) is verified.
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2.2 The method and the solution
Let us now apply the optimality principle in Lemma 2.1 in order to find a Nash equilibrium. In the
linear-quadratic case the laws of the state and the controls intervene only through their expectations.
Thus we will use a simplified optimality principle where P is simply replaced by E in conditions (ii)
and (iii) of Lemma 2.1. The general procedure is the following:
Step 1. We guess a candidate for Wα,i. To do so we suppose that Wα,it = wit(Xαt ,E [Xαt ]) for
some parametric adapted random field {wit(x, x), t ∈ [0, T ], x, x ∈ Rd} of the form wit(x, x) =
Kit .(x− x)⊗2 + Λit.x⊗2 + 2Y iᵀt x+Rit.
Step 2. We set Sα,it = e−ρtwit(Xαt ,E [Xαt ]) +
∫ t
0 e
−ρuf i(u,Xαu ,E [Xαu ] ,αu,E [αu])du for i ∈J1, nK and α ∈ A .We then compute ddtE[Sα,it ] = e−ρtE[Dα,it ] (with Itô’s formula) where the
drift Dα,i takes the form:
E
[
Dα,it
]
= E
[
−ρwit(Xαt ,E [Xαt ]) +
d
dt
E
[
wit(X
α
t ,E [X
α
t ])
]
+ f i(t,Xαt ,E [X
α
t ] ,αt,E [αt])
]
.
Step 3. We then constrain the coefficients of the random field so that the conditions of Lemma
2.1 are satisfied. This leads to a system of backward ordinary and stochastic differential
equations for the coefficients of wi.
Step 4. At time t, given the state and the controls of the other players, we seek the action αi
cancelling the drift. We thus obtain the best response function of each player.
Step 5. We compute the fixed point of the best response functions in order to find an open
loop Nash equilibrium t 7→ α?t .
Step 6. We check the validity of our computations.
2.2.1 Step 1: guess the random fields
The process t 7→ E [wit(Xαt ,E [Xαt ])] is meant to be equal to E [gi(XαT ,E [XαT ])] at time T , where
g(x, x) = P i.(x− x)⊗2 + (P i + P˜ i).x⊗2 + riᵀx with (P, P˜ , ri) ∈ (Sd)2 × L2FT (Rd). It is then natural
to search for a field wi of the form wit(x, x) = Kit .(x−x)⊗2 +Λit.x⊗2 +2Y iᵀt x+Rit with the processes
(Ki,Λi, Y i, Ri) in (L∞([0, T ],Sd+)2 × S2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rd)× L∞([0, T ],R) and solution to:
dKit = K˙
i
tdt, K
i
T = P
i
dΛit = Λ˙
i
tdt, Λ
i
T = P
i + P˜ i
dY it = Y˙
i
t dt+ Z
i
tdWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, Y iT = ri
dRit = R˙
i
tdt, R
i
T = 0,
where (K˙i, Λ˙i, R˙i) are deterministic processes valued in Sd×Sd×R and (Y˙ i, Zi) are adapted processes
valued in Rd.
2.2.2 Step 2: derive their drifts
For i ∈ J1, nK, t ∈ [0, T ] and α ∈ A, we set:
S
α,i
t := e
−ρtwit(Xt,E [Xt]) +
∫ t
0
e−ρuf i(u,Xαu ,E [X
α
u ] ,αu,E [αu])du
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and then compute the drift of the deterministic function t 7→ E[Sα,it ]:
dE[Sα,it ]
dt
= e−ρtE[Dα,it ]
= e−ρtE[(Xt −Xt)ᵀ[K˙it + Φit](Xt −Xt) +Xtᵀ(Λ˙it + Ψit)Xt + 2[Y˙ it + ∆it]ᵀXt
+ R˙it − ρRit + Γit + χit(αi,t)],
where we have defined:
χit(αi,t) := (αi,t − αi,t)ᵀSii,t(αi − αi,t) + αᵀi,tSˆii,tαi,t + 2[U ii,t(Xt −Xt) + V ii,tXt +Oii,t + ξii,t − ξ
i
i,t]
ᵀαi,t
with the following coefficients:
Φit = Q
i
t + σ
ᵀ
x,tK
i
tσx,t +K
i
tbx,t + b
ᵀ
x,tK
i
t − ρKit
Ψit = Qˆ
i
t + σˆ
ᵀ
x,tK
i
t σˆx,t + Λ
i
tbˆx,t + bˆ
ᵀ
x,tΛ
i
t − ρΛit
∆it = L
i
x,t + b
ᵀ
x,tY
i
t + b˜
ᵀ
x,tY
i
t + σ
ᵀ
x,tZ
i
t + σ˜
ᵀ
x,tZ
i
t + Λ
i
tβt
+σᵀx,tK
i
tγt + σ˜
ᵀ
x,tK
i
tγt +K
i
t(βt − βt)− ρY it
+
∑
k 6=i U
iᵀ
k,t(αk,t − αk,t) + V iᵀk,tαk,t
Γit = γ
ᵀ
tK
i
tγt + 2β
ᵀ
t Y
i
t + 2γ
ᵀ
t Z
i
t
+
∑
k 6=i(αk,t − αk,t)ᵀSik,t(αk,t − αk,t) + αᵀk,tSˆik,tαk,t + 2[Oik,t + ξik,t − ξ
i
k,t]
ᵀαk,t − ρRit,
(5)
and 
Sik,t = N
i
k,t + σ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
tσk,t
Sˆik,t = Nˆ
i
k,t + σˆ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
t σˆk,t
U ik,t = I
i
k,t + σ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
tσx,t + b
ᵀ
k,tK
i
t
V ik,t = Iˆ
i
k,t + σˆ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
t σˆx,t + bˆ
ᵀ
k,tΛ
i
t
Oik,t = L
i
k,t + bˆ
ᵀ
k,tY
i
t + σˆ
ᵀ
k,tZ
i
t + σˆ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
tγt
+12
∑
k 6=i(Jˆ
i
i,k,t + Jˆ
iᵀ
k,i,t)αk,t
J ik,l,t = G
i
k,l,t + σ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
tσl,t
Jˆ ik,l,t = Gˆ
i
k,l,t + σˆ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
t σˆl,t
ξik,t = L
i
k,t + b
ᵀ
k,tY
i
t + σ
ᵀ
k,tZ
i
t + σ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
tγt
+12
∑
k 6=i(J
i
i,k,t + J
iᵀ
k,i,t)αk,t.
(6)
2.2.3 Step 3: constrain their coefficients
Now that we have computed the drift, we need to constrain the coefficients so that Sα,i satisfies
the condition of Lemma 2.1. Let us assume for the moment that Sii,t and Sˆ
i
i,t are positive definite
matrices (this will be ensured by the positive definiteness of K). That implies that there exists an
invertible matrix θit such that θitSii,tθ
iᵀ
t = Sˆ
i
i,t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. We can now rewrite the drift as: "a
square in αi" + "other terms not depending in αi". Since we can form the following square:
E[χit(αi,t)] = E[(αi,t − αi,t + θiᵀt αi,t − ηit)Sii,t(αi,t − αi,t + θiᵀt αi,t − ηit)− ζit ]
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with: 
ηit = a
i,0
t (Xt, Xt) + θ
iᵀ
t a
i,1
t (Xt)
ai,0t (x, x) = −
(
Sii,t
)−1
U ii,t(x− x)−
(
Sii,t
)−1
(ξii,t − ξ
i
i,t)
ai,1t (x) = −
(
Sˆii,t
)−1
(V ii,tx+O
i
i,t)
ζit = (Xt −Xt)ᵀU iᵀi,t
(
Sit
)−1
U it (Xt −Xt) +XtV iᵀi,t
(
Sˆit
)−1
V ii,tXt
+2(U iᵀi,t
(
Sit
)−1
(ξii,t − ξ
i
i,t) + V
i
i,t
(
Sˆii,t
)−1
Oii,t)Xt
+(ξii,t − ξ
i
i,t)
ᵀ(Sii,t)−1(ξii,t − ξii,t) +Oiᵀi,t(Sˆii,t)−1Oii,t,
we can then rewrite the drift in the following form:
E[Dα,it ] = E[(Xt −Xt)ᵀ[K˙it + Φi0t ](Xt −Xt) +Xtᵀ(Λ˙it + Ψi0t )Xt + 2[Y˙ it + ∆i0t ]ᵀXt
+ R˙it + Γ
i0
t
+ (αi,t − αi,t + θiᵀt αi,t − ηit)Sii,t(αi,t − αi,t + θiᵀt αi,t − ηit)],
where 
Φi0t = Φ
i
t − U iᵀi,t
(
Sii,t
)−1
U ii,t
Ψi0t = Ψ
i
t − V iᵀi,t
(
Sˆii,t
)−1
V ii,t
∆i0t = ∆
i
t − U iᵀi,t
(
Sii,t
)−1
(ξii,t − ξ
i
i,t)− V iᵀi,t
(
Sˆit
)−1
Oii,t
Γi0t = Γ
i
t − (ξii,t − ξ
i
i,t)
ᵀ(Sii,t)−1(ξii,t − ξit)−Oiᵀi,t(Sˆii,t)−1Oii,t.
(7)
We can finally constrain the coefficients. By choosing the coefficients Ki,Γi, Y i and Ri so that
only the square remains, the drift for each player i ∈ J1, nK can be rewritten as a square only (in the
next step we will verify that we can indeed choose such coefficients). More precisely we set Ki,Γi, Y i
and Ri as the solution of: 
dKit = −Φi0t dt KiT = P i
dΛit = −Ψi0t dt ΛiT = P i + P˜ i
dY it = −∆i0t dt+ ZitdWt Y iT = ri
dRit = −Γi0t dt RiT = 0,
(8)
and stress the fact that Y i, Zi, Ri depend on α−i, which appears in the coefficients ∆i0, and Γi0.
With such coefficients the drift takes now the form:
E[Dα,it ] = E[(αi,t − αi,t + θiᵀt αi,t − ηit)Sii,t(αi,t − αi,t + θiᵀt αi,t − ηit)]
= E[(αi,t − αi,t − ai,1t + θiᵀt (αi,t − ai,0t ))Sii,t(αi,t − αi,t − ai,1t + θiᵀt (αi,t − ai,0t ))]
and thus satisfies the nonnegativity constraint: E[Dα,it ] ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ J1, nK, and α ∈ A.
2.2.4 Step 4: find the best response functions
Proposition 2.2. Assume that for all i ∈ J1, nK, (Ki,Λi, Y i, Zi, Ri) is a solution of (8) given α−i
∈ A−i. Then the set of processes
αi,t = a
i,0
t (Xt,E[Xt]) + a
i,1
t (E[Xt])
= −(Sii,t)−1U ii,t(Xt − E[Xt])− (Sii,t)−1(ξii,t − ξii,t)− (Sˆii,t)−1(V ii,tE[Xt] +Oii,t) (9)
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(depending on α−i) where X is the state process with the feedback controls α = (α1, ..., αn), are
best-response functions, i.e., J i(αi, α−i) = V i(α−i) for all i ∈ J1, nK. Moreover we have
V i(α−i) = E[Wi,α0 ]
= E[Ki0.(X0 −X0)⊗2 + Λi0.X⊗20 + 2Y iᵀ0 X0 +Ri0].
Proof. We check that the assumptions of Lemma 2.1 are satisfied. Since Wα,i is of the form
W
α,i
t = w
i
t(X
α
t ,E[X
α
t ]), condition (i) is verified. The condition (ii) is satisfied thanks to the termi-
nal conditions imposed on the system (8). Since (Ki,Λi, Y i, Zi, Ri) is solution to (8), the drift of
t 7→ E[Sα,i] is positive for all i ∈ J1, nK and all α ∈ A, which implies condition (iii). Finally, for
α ∈ A, we see that E[Dα,it ] ≡ 0 for t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ J1, nK if and only if:
αi,t − αi,t − ai,1t (Xαt ,E[Xαt ]) + θiᵀt (αi,t − ai,0t (E[Xαt ])) = 0 a.s. t ∈ [0, T ].
Since θit is invertible, we get αi,t = a
i,0
t by taking the expectation in the above formula. Thus
E[Dα,it ] ≡ 0 for every i ∈ J1, nK and t ∈ [0, T ] if and only if αi,t = αi,t + ai,1t = ai,1t + ai,0t for every
i ∈ J1, nK and t ∈ [0, T ]. For such controls for the players, the condition (iv) is satisfied. We now
check that αi ∈ Ai for every i ∈ J1, nK (i.e. it satisfies the square integrability condition). Since
X is solution to a linear Mckean-Vlasov dynamics and satisfies the square integrability condition
E[sup0≤t≤T |Xt|2] <∞, it implies that αi ∈ L2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rdi) since Sii , U ii , Sˆii , V ii are bounded and
(Oii, ξ
i
i) ∈ L2([0, T ],Rdi)× L2(Ω× [0, T ],Rdi). Therefore αi ∈ Ai for every i ∈ J1, nK.
2.2.5 Step 5: search for a fixed point
We now find semi-explicit expressions for the optimal controls of each player. The issue here is
the fact that the controls of the other players appear in the best response functions of each player
through the vectors (Y 1, Z1), ..., (Y n, Zn). To solve this fixed point problem, we first rewrite (9)
and the backward equations followed by (Y, Z) = ((Y 1, Z1), ..., (Y n, Zn)) in the following way (note
that we omit the time dependence of the coefficients to make the notations less cluttered):
α?t −α?t = Sx(Xt −Xt) + Sy(Yt − Y t)+ Sz(Zt − Zt)+H −H
α?t = SˆxXt + SˆyY t + SˆzZt + Hˆ
dY t =
(
Py(Yt − Y t) + Pz(Zt − Zt) + Pα(αt − αt) + F − F
+ PˆyY t + PˆzZt + Pˆααt + Fˆ
)
dt
+ZtdWt,
(10)
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where we define
S =
(
(Sii)
−11i=j
)
i,j∈J1,nK
Sˆ =
(
(Sˆii)
−11i=j
)
i,j∈J1,nK
J = 12
(
(J iij + J
i
ji)1i 6=j
)
i,j∈J1,nK
Jˆ = 12
(
(Jˆ iij + Jˆ
i
ji)1i 6=j
)
i,j∈J1,nK
J = − (Id + SJ)−1 S
Jˆ = −
(
Id + SˆJˆ
)−1
Sˆ
Sx = J
(
U ii
)
i∈J1,nK
Sˆx = Jˆ
(
V ii
)
i∈J1,nK
Sy = J (1i=jb
ᵀ
i )i,j∈J1,nK
Sˆy = Jˆ
(
1i=j bˆ
ᵀ
i
)
i,j∈J1,nK
Sz = J (σ
ᵀ
i )i∈J1,nK
Sˆz = Jˆ (σˆ
ᵀ
i )i∈J1,nK
H = J
(
Lii + σ
ᵀ
iK
iγ
)
i∈J1,nK
Hˆ = Jˆ
(
Lii + σˆ
ᵀ
iK
iγ
)
i∈J1,nK

Py = (1i=j(U
i
i (S
i
i)
−1bᵀi − bᵀx + ρ))i,j∈J1,nK
Pˆy = (1i=j(V
i
i (Sˆ
i
i)
−1bˆᵀi − bˆᵀx + ρ))i,j∈J1,nK
Pz = (1i=j(U
i
i (S
i
i)
−1σᵀi − σᵀx))i,j∈J1,nK
Pˆz = (1i=j(V
i
i (S
i
i)
−1σˆᵀi − σˆᵀx))i,j∈J1,nK
Pα = −(1i 6=j(U ij + U ii (Sii)−1(J iij + J iᵀji )))i,j∈J1,nK
Pˆα = −(1i 6=j(V ij + V ii (Sˆii)−1(Jˆ iij + Jˆ iᵀji )))i,j∈J1,nK
F = (Kiβ + σᵀxKiγ)i∈J1,nK
Fˆ = (U ii (S
i
i)
−1(Li + σ
ᵀ
iK
iγ)− Lx − σᵀxKiγ −Kiβ)i∈J1,nK.
(11)
Now, the strategy is to propose an ansatz for t ∈ [0, T ] 7→ Y t in the form:
Y t = pit(Xt −Xt) + pˆitXt + ηt (12)
where (pi, pˆi, η) ∈ L∞([0, T ],Rnd×d)× L∞([0, T ],Rnd×d)× S2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rnd) satisfy:
dηt = ψtdt+ φtdWt, ηT = r = (r
i)i∈J1,nK
dpit = p˙itdt, piT = 0
dpˆit = ˙ˆpitdt, pˆiT = 0.
By applying Itô’s formula to the ansatz we then obtain:
dY t = p˙it(Xt −Xt)dt+ pitd(Xt −Xt) + ˙ˆpitXtdt+ pˆitdXt + ψtdt+ φtdW
= dt
[
p˙it(Xt −Xt) + ψt − ψt + pit
(
β − β + bx(Xt −Xt) +B(αt −αt)
)]
+ dt
[
˙ˆpitXt + ψt + pˆit
(
β + bˆxXt + Bˆαt
)]
+ dWt
[
φt + pit
(
γ + σxXt + σ˜xXt + Σαt + Σ˜αt
)]
.
By comparing the two Itô’s decompositions of Y , we get
Py(Yt − Y t) + Pz(Zt − Zt) + Pα(αt − αt) + F − F = p˙it(Xt −Xt) + ψt − ψt
+pit
(
β − β + bx(Xt −Xt) +B(αt −αt)
)
PˆyY t + PˆzZt + Pˆααt + Fˆ =
[
˙ˆpitXt + ψt + pˆit
(
β + bˆxXt + Bˆαt
)]
Zt =
[
φt + pit
(
γ + σxXt + σ˜xXt + Σαt + Σ˜αt
)]
.
(13)
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We now substitute the Y by its ansatz in the best response equation (10), and obtain the system:
(Id− SzpiΣ)(α?t −α?t) = (Sx + Sypit + Szpitσx)(Xt −Xt)
+(H −H + Sy(ηt − ηt) + Sz(φt − φt + pit(γ − γ)))
(Id− SˆzpitΣˆ)α?t = (Sˆx + Sˆypˆit + Sˆzpitσˆx)Xt + (Hˆ + Sˆyηt + Sˆz(φt + pit.γ)).
(14)
To make the next computations slightly less painful we rewrite (14) as
α?t −α?t = Ax(Xt −Xt) +Rt −Rt
α?t = AˆxXt + Rˆt
where
Ax := (Id− SzpitΣ)−1(Sx + Sypit + Szpitσx)
Aˆx := (Id− SˆzpitΣˆ)−1(Sˆx + Sˆypit + Sˆzpitσˆx)
Rt := (Id− SzpitΣ)−1(H + Syηt + Sz(φt + pitγ))
Rˆt := (Id− SˆzpitΣˆ)−1(Hˆ + Sˆyη + Sˆz(φt + pitγ)).
(15)
By injecting (14) into (13) we have:
0 = [p˙it + pitbx − Pypit − Pzpit(σx + ΣAx)− (Pα − pitB)Ax] (Xt −Xt)
+ψt − ψt + pit(β − β)− (Pα − pitB)(R−R)− (F − F )
−Pz(φt − φt + pit(γ − γ + Σ(R−R)))− Py(ηt − ηt)
0 =
[
˙ˆpit + pˆitbˆx − Pˆypˆi − Pˆzpit(σˆx + ΣˆAˆx)− (Pˆα − pˆitBˆ)Aˆx
]
Xt
+ψt + pˆitβ − (Pˆα − pˆitBˆ)Rˆ− Fˆ − Pˆz(φt + pit(γ + ΣˆRˆ))− Pˆyη.
Thus we constrain the coefficients (pi, pˆi, ψ, φ) of the ansatz of Y to satisfy:
p˙it = −pibx + Pypit + Pzpitσx + (Pα + PzΣ)(Id− SzpitΣ)−1(Sx + Sypit + Szpitσx)
−pitB(Id− SzpitΣ)−1(Sx + Sypit + Szpitσx)
piT = 0
˙ˆpit = −pˆitbˆx + Pˆypˆit + Pˆzpitσˆx + (Pˆα + PˆzΣˆ)(Id− SˆzpitΣˆ)−1(Sˆx + Sˆypˆit + Sˆzpitσˆx)
−pˆitBˆ(Id− SˆzpitΣˆ)−1(Sˆx + Sˆypˆit + Sˆzpitσˆx)
pˆiT = 0
dηt = ψtdt+ φtdW
ηT = r
where:
ψt − ψt = −pit(β − β) + (Pα − pitB)(R−R) + (F − F )
+Pz(φt − φt + pit(γ − γ + Σ(R−R))) + Py(ηt − ηt)
ψt = −pˆitβ + (Pˆα − pˆitBˆ)Rˆ+ Fˆ + Pˆz(φt + pit(γ + ΣˆRˆ)) + Pˆyηt
Rt := (Id− SzpiΣ)−1(H + Syη + Sz(φ+ piγ))
Rˆt := (Id− SˆzpiΣˆ)−1(Hˆ + Sˆyη + Sˆz(φ+ piγ)).
(16)
We now have a feedback form for (Y, Z) = ((Y 1, Z1), ..., (Y n, Zn)). We can inject it in the best
response functions α? in order to obtain the optimal controls in feedback form. We then inject these
latter in the state equation in order to obtain an explicit expression of t 7→ X?t .
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2.2.6 Step 6: check the validity
Let us now check the existence and uniqueness of t 7→ (Kit ,Λit, (Y it , Zit), Rit, pit, pˆit, (ηt, φt)) where
Ki ∈ L∞([0, T ],Sd+), Λi ∈ L∞([0, T ], Sd+), (Y it , Zit) ∈ S2F(Ω × [0, T ],Rd) × L2F(Ω × [0, T ],Rd), Ri ∈
L∞([0, T ],R), pi, pˆi ∈ L∞([0, T ],Rnd×d) and (η, φ) ∈ S2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rnd)× L2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rnd), under
the assumptions (H1)-(H2). We recall that t 7→ (Kit ,Λit, (Y it , Zit), Rit and t 7→ (pit, pˆit, (ηt, φt)) are
solutions respectively to (8) and (16). Fix i ∈ J1, nK:
(i) We first consider the coefficients Ki which follow Ricatti equations:
K˙it +Q
i
t + σ
ᵀ
x,tK
i
tσx,t +K
i
tbx,t + b
ᵀ
x,tK
i
t − ρKit
−(Iik,t + σᵀk,tKitσx,t + bᵀk,tKit)(N ik,t + σᵀk,tKitσk,t)−1(Iik,t + σᵀk,tKitσx,t + bᵀk,tKit) = 0
KiT = P
i.
By standard result in control theory (see [16], Ch. 6, Thm 7.2]) under (H1) and (H2) there
exists a unique solution Ki ∈ L∞([0, T ],Sd+).
(ii) Given Ki let us now consider the Λi’s. They also follow Ricatti equations:{
Λ˙i + QˆiKt + Λ
i
tbˆx,t + bˆ
ᵀ
x,tΛ
i
t − ρΛit − (IˆiKt + bˆᵀi,tΛit)(Nˆ iKt )−1(IˆiKt + bˆᵀi,tΛit) = 0
ΛiT = Pˆ
i
where we define: 
QˆiKt := Qˆ
i
t + σˆ
ᵀ
x,tK
i
t σˆx,t
IˆiKt := Iˆ
i
i,t + σˆ
ᵀ
i,tK
i
t σˆx,t
Nˆ iKt := Nˆ
i
i,t + σˆ
ᵀ
i,tK
i
t σˆi,t.
We need the same arguments as for Ki. The only missing argument to conclude the existence
and uniqueness of Λi is: QˆiK − (IˆiK)ᵀ(Nˆ iK)−1IˆiK ≥ 0. As in [2] we can prove with some
algebraic calculations that it is implied by the hypothesis Qˆi − (Iˆi)ᵀ(Nˆ i)−1Iˆi ≥ 0 that we
made in (H2).
(iii) Given (Ki,Λi) we now consider the equation for (Y i, Zi) which is a linear mean-field BSDE
of the form:{
dY it = V
i
t + G
i
t(Y
i
t − E[Y it ]) + GˆitE[Y it ] + Jit(Zit − E[Zit ]) + JˆitE[Zit ] + ZitdWt
Y iT = r
i,
(17)
where the deterministic coefficients Git, Gˆi, Ji, Jˆi ∈ L∞([0, T ],Rd×d) and the stochastic process
Vi ∈ L2([0, T ],Rd) are defined as:
Vit := −Lix,t − Λitβt − σᵀx,tKitγt − σ˜ᵀx,tKitγt −Kit(βt − βt)−
∑
k 6=i
(
U ik,t(αk,t − αk,t) + V ik,tαk,t
)
+U iᵀi,tS
i−1
t (L
i
k,t − E[Lik,t] + σᵀi,tKit(γt − E [γt]) + 12
∑
k 6=i(J
i
i,k,t + J
iᵀ
k,i,t)(αk,t − E [αk,t]))
+V iᵀi,t Sˆ
i−1
t (E[L
i
k,t] + σˆ
ᵀ
i,tK
i
t − E [γt] + 12
∑
k 6=i(Jˆ
i
i,k,t + Jˆ
iᵀ
k,i,t)E [αk,t])
Git := ρId − bᵀx,t + U iᵀi,tSi−1i,t bᵀi,t
Gˆit = ρId − bˆᵀx,t + V iᵀi,t Sˆi−1i,t bˆᵀi,t
Jit := −σᵀx,t + U iᵀi,tSi−1i,t σᵀk,t
Jˆit := −σˆᵀx,t + V iᵀi,t Sˆi−1i,t σᵀk,t.
(18)
By standard results (see Thm. 2.1 in [12]) we obtain that there exists a unique solution
(Y i, Zi) ∈ S2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rd×d)× L2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rd×d) to (17).
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(iv) Given (Ki,Λi, Y i, Zi) we consider the equation of Ri which is a linear ODE whose solution is
given by:
Rit =
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)hisds,
where hi is a deterministic function defined by:
hit = −E[γᵀtKitγt + 2βᵀt Y it + 2γᵀt Zit+∑
k 6=i
(αk,t − αk,t)ᵀSik,t(αk,t − αk,t) + αᵀk,tSˆik,tαk,t + 2[Oik,t + ξik,t − ξ
i
k,t]
ᵀαk,t]
+ E
[
(ξii,t − ξii,t)ᵀSi−1t (ξii,t − ξ
i
t)−Oiᵀi,tSˆi−1t Oii,t
]
,
(19)
and the expressions of the coefficients are recalled in (6).
(v) The final step is to verify that the procedure to find a fixed point is valid. More precisely we
need to ensure that t 7→ (pit, pˆit, ηt) is well defined. It is difficult to ensure the well posedness of
t 7→ (pit, pˆit) for two reasons: first because pi and pˆi follow Ricatti equations but are not squared
matrices; and second because pi appears in the equation followed by pˆi. We are not aware of
any work addressing this kind of equations in a general setting.
If we suppose t 7→ (pit, pˆit) well defined, then t 7→ (ηt, φt) follows a linear mean-field BSDE of
the type:{
dηt =
(
Vt + Gt(ηt − E[ηt]) + GˆtE [ηt] + Jt(φt − E[φt]) + JˆtE [φt]
)
dt+ φtdWt
ηT = r,
(20)
where the deterministic coefficients Git, Gˆi, Ji, Jˆi ∈ L∞([0, T ],Rnd×nd) and the stochastic process
Vi ∈ L2([0, T ],Rnd) are defined as:
Vt := −pi(β − β) + F − F + Pzpi(γ − γ) + (Pα − piB + PzpiΣ)(Id − SzpiΣ)−1(H −H + Szpi(γ − γ))
−pˆiβ + Fˆ + Pˆzpiγ + (Pˆα − pˆiBˆ + PˆzpiΣˆ)(Id − SˆzpiΣˆ)−1(Hˆ + Sˆzpˆiγ)
Gt :=
[
Py + (Pα − piB + PzpiΣ)((Id − SzpiΣ)−1Sy)
]
Gˆt = Pˆy
Jt :=
[
Pz + (Pα − piB + PzpiΣ)((Id − SzpiΣ)−1Sz)
]
Jˆt := −σˆᵀx,t + V iᵀi,t Sˆi−1i,t σᵀk,t.
Again, by standard results (see Thm. 2.1 in [12]) we obtain that there exists a unique solution
(η, φ) ∈ S2(Ω× [0, T ],Rd×d)× L2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rd×d) to (20).
To sum up the arguments previously presented, our main result provides the following charac-
terization of the Nash equilibrium:
Theorem 2.3. Suppose assumptions (H1) and (H2). Suppose also that the system associated with
the fixed point search (16) is well defined. Then α? = (α1, ..., αn) defined by{
α?t −α?t = Sx,t(X?t −X?t ) + Sy,t(Yt − Y t)+ Sz,t(Zt − Zt)+Ht −Ht
α?t = Sˆx,tX
?
t + Sˆy,tY t + Sˆz,tZt + Hˆt
where Sx, Sy, Sz,H, Sˆx, Sˆy, Sˆz, Hˆ are defined in (11), (Y, Z) are in S2F(Ω×[0, T ],Rnd×d)×L2F(Ω×
[0, T ],Rnd×d) and satisfy (12) and (16), is a Nash equilibrium.
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3 Some extensions
3.1 The case of infinite horizon
Let us now tackle the infinite horizon case. The method is similar to the finite-horizon case but some
adaptations are needed when dealing with the well posedness of (Ki,Λi, Y i, Ri) and the admissibility
of the controls.
We redefine the set of admissible controls for for each player i ∈ J1, nK as:
Ai =
{
α : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rdi s.t. α is F-adapted and
∫ ∞
0
e−ρuE[|αu|2]du <∞
}
while the controlled state defined on R+ now follows a dynamics of the form{
dXt = b(t,X
α
t ,E [X
α
t ] ,αt,E [αt])dt+ σ(t,X
α
t ,E [X
α
t ] ,αt,E [αt])dWt
Xα0 = X0
(21)
where for each t ∈ [0, T ], x, x ∈ Rd, ai, ai ∈ Rdi :
b(t, x, x,a,a) = βt + bxx+ b˜xx+
∑n
i=1 biai + b˜iai
= βt + bxx+ b˜xx+Bat + B˜at
σ(t, x, x,a,a) = γt + σxx+ σ˜xx+
∑n
i=1 σiai + σ˜iai
= γt + σxx+ σ˜xx+ Σa+ Σ˜a.
(22)
Notice that now only the coefficients β and γ are allowed to be stochastic processes. The other
linear coefficients are constant matrices.
The goal of each player i ∈ J1, nK during the game is still to minimize her cost functional with
respect to control αi over Ai, and given control α−i of the other players:
J i(αi, α
−i) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtf i(t,Xαt ,E [X
α
t ] ,αt,E [αt])dt
]
(23)
where for each t ∈ [0, T ], x, x ∈ Rd, ai, ai ∈ Rdi we have set the running cost for each player as:
f i(t, x, x,a,a) = (x− x)ᵀQi(x− x) + xᵀ[Qi + Q˜i]x
+
∑n
k=1 a
ᵀ
kI
i
k(x− x) + aᵀk(Iik + I˜ik)x
+
∑n
k=1(ak − ak)ᵀN ik(ak − ak) + ak(N ik + N˜ ik,)ak
+
∑
0≤k 6=l≤n(ak − ak)ᵀGik,l(al − al) + aᵀk(Gik,l + G˜ik,l)al
+2[Liᵀx,tx+
∑n
k=1 L
iᵀ
k,tak].
Note that the only coefficients that we allow to be time dependent are Lix and Lik for k ∈ J1, nK
which may be stochastic processes.
3.1.1 Assumptions
We detail below the new assumptions:
(H1’) The coefficients in (22) satisfy:
a) β, γ ∈ L2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rd)
b) bx, b˜x, σx, σ˜x ∈ Rd×d; bi, b˜i, σi, σ˜i ∈ Rd×di
(H2’) The coefficients of the cost functional (3) satisfy:
14
a) Qi, Q˜i ∈ Sd+; N ik, N˜ ik ∈ Sdk+ ; Iik, I˜ik ∈ Rdk×d
b) Lix ∈ L2F(Ω× R?+,Rd), Lik ∈ L2F(Ω× R?+,Rdk)
c) N ik > 0 Q
i − Iiᵀi (N ii )−1Iii ≥ 0
d) Nˆ ik,t > 0 Qˆ
i − Iˆiᵀi (Nˆ ii )−1Iˆii ≥ 0
(H3’) ρ > 2
(
|bx|+ |b˜x|+ 8(|σx|2 + |σ˜x|2)
)
As shown below, the new hypothesis (H3’) ensure the well posedness of our problem. Notice
first that by (H1’) and classical results, there exists a unique strong solution Xα to the SDE (21).
Furthermore by (H1’) and (H3’) we obtain by similar arguments as in [2] the following estimate:∫ ∞
0
e−ρuE[|Xαu |2]du ≤ Cα(1 + E[|X0|2]) <∞, (24)
in which Cα is a constant depending on α = (α1, ..., αn) only through
∫∞
0 e
−ρE[|αu|2]du. Finally by
(H2’) and (24) the minimizing problem (23) is well defined for each player.
3.1.2 A weak submartingale optimality principle on infinite horizon
We now give an easy adaptation of the weak submartingale optimality principle in the case of infinite
horizon.
Lemma 3.1 (Weak submartingale optimality principle). Suppose there exists a couple
(α?, (W.,i)i∈J1,nK), where α? ∈ A and W.,i = {Wα,it , t ∈ R?+,α ∈ A} is a family of adapted processes
indexed by A for each i ∈ J1, nK, such that:
(i) For every α ∈ A, E[Wα,i0 ] is independent of the control αi ∈ Ai;
(ii) For every α ∈ A, limt→∞ e−ρtE
[
W
α,i
t
]
= 0;
(iii) For every α ∈ A, the map t ∈ R?+ 7→ E
[
S
α,i
t
]
, with
S
α,i
t = e
−ρtWα,it +
∫ t
0 e
−ρuf i(u,Xαu ,PXαu ,αu,Pαu)du is well defined and non-decreasing;
(iv) The map t 7→ E[Sα?,it ] is constant for every t ∈ R?+;
Then α? is a Nash equilibrium and J i(α?) = E[Wα
?,i
0 ]. Moreover, any other Nash-equilibrium α˜
such that E[Wα˜,i0 ] = E[W
α?,i
0 ] and J
i(α˜) = J i(α?) for any i ∈ J1, nK satisfies the condition (iv).
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as in Lemma 2.1.
Let us now describe the steps to follow in order to apply Lemma 3.1. Since they are similar to
the ones in the finite-horizon case, we only report the main changes.
Steps 1-3
For each player i ∈ J1, nK we still search for a random field {wit(x, x), t ∈ [0, T ], x, x ∈ Rd} of the
form wit(x, x) = Kit .(x − x)⊗2 + Λit.x⊗2 + 2Y iᵀt x + Rit for which the optimality principle in Lemma
3.1 now leads to the system: 
dKit = −Φi0t dt
dΛit = −Ψi0t dt
dY it = −∆i0t dt+ ZitdWt
dRit = −Γi0t dt, t ≥ 0.
(25)
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Notice that there are no terminal conditions anymore since we are in the infinite horizon case. The
coefficients Φi0,Ψi0,∆i0t ,Γi0t are defined in (7). The fourth step is exactly the same as in the finite
horizon case.
Step 5
We now search for a fixed point of the best response functions. Let us define Y = (Y 1, ...Y n)
and propose an ansatz in a feedback form Y : Yt = pi(Xt − E [Xt]) + pˆiE [Xt] + ηt where pi, pˆi ∈
L∞(R+,Rnd×d) and η ∈ L2F(Ω× R+,Rnd) satisfy
0 = −pibx + Pypi + Pzpiσx + (Pα + PzΣ)(Id− SzpiΣ)−1(Sx + Sypi + Szpitσx)
−piB(Id− SzpiΣ)−1(Sx + Sypi + Szpiσx)
0 = −pˆibˆx + Pˆypˆi + Pˆzpiσˆx + (Pˆα + PˆzΣˆ)(Id− SˆzpiΣˆ)−1(Sˆx + Sˆypˆi + Sˆzpiσˆx)
−pˆiBˆ(Id− SˆzpiΣˆ)−1(Sˆx + Sˆypˆi + Sˆzpiσˆx)
dηt = ψtdt+ φtdWt
with:
ψt − ψt = −pit(β − β) + (Pα − pitB)(R−R) + (F − F )+
Pz(φt − φt + pit(γ − γ + Σ(Rt −Rt))) + Py(ηt − ηt)
ψt = −pˆitβ + (Pˆα − pˆitBˆ)Rˆt + Fˆ + Pˆz(φ+ pit(γ + ΣˆRˆt)) + Pˆyηt
Rt := (Id− SzpitΣ)−1(H + Syηt + Sz(φt + pitγ))
Rˆt := (Id− SˆzpitΣˆ)−1(Hˆ + Sˆyηt + Sˆz(φt + pitγ))
(26)
where the coefficients are defined in (11).
Step 6
We finally tackle the well-posedness of (25) and (26).
(i) We first consider the ODE for Ki. Since the map (t, k) 7→ φi0t (k) does not depend on time (all
the coefficient being constant) we search for a constant non-negative matrix Ki ∈ Sd satisfying
Φi0(Ki) = 0, more precisely solution to:
Qi + σᵀxK
iσx +K
ibx + b
ᵀ
xK
i − ρKi
− (Iik + σᵀkKiσx + bᵀkKi)(N ik + σᵀkKiσk)−1(Iik + σᵀkKiσx + bᵀkKi) = 0.
(27)
As in [2] we can show using a limit argument that there exists Ki ∈ Sd+ solution to (27). The
argument for Λi is the same as for Ki.
(ii) Given (Ki,Λi) the equation for (Y i, Zi) is a linear mean-field BSDE on infinite horizon:
dY it = V
i
t + G
i(Y it − E[Y it ]) + GˆiE[Y it ] + Ji(Zit − E[Zit ]) + JˆiE[Zit ] + ZitdWt,
where the coefficient are defined in (18). Notice that now Gi, Gˆi, Ji, Jˆi are all constant matrices.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no general results ensuring the existence for such
equation. We then add the following assumption:
(H4’) There exists a solution (Y i, Zi) ∈ ×S2F(Ω× R+,Rd)× L2F(Ω× R+,Rd)
(iii) Given (Ki,Λi, Y i, Zi) the equation for Ri is a linear ODE whose solution is:
Rit =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)his ds,
where hi is a deterministic function defined in (19).
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(iv) We now study the well posedness of the fixed point procedure. More precisely we need to
ensure that the process t→ (pi, pˆi, ηt) defined as a solution of the system (26), recalled below,
is well defined. Note that in the infinite horizon framework we search for constant pi and pˆi.
0 = −pibx + Pypi + Pzpiσx + (Pα + PzΣ)(Id− SzpiΣ)−1(Sx + Sypi + Szpiσx)
−piB(Id− SzpiΣ)−1(Sx + Sypi + Szpiσx)
0 = −pˆibˆx + Pˆypˆi + Pˆzpiσˆx + (Pˆα + PˆzΣˆ)(Id− SˆzpiΣˆ)−1(Sˆx + Sˆypˆi + Sˆzpiσˆx)
−pˆiBˆ(Id− SˆzpiΣˆ)−1(Sˆx + Sˆypˆi + Sˆzpiσˆx)
dηt = ψtdt+ φtdWt, t ≥ 0.
(28)
Existence of (pi, pˆi) in whole generality is a difficult problem. Let us first rewrite the system
(28) as:
F ((pi, pˆi),C) = 0
Where C = (bx, σx, B,Σ, bˆx, σˆx, Bˆ, Σˆ, Sx, Sy, Sz, Sˆx, Sˆy, Sˆz, Py, Pz, Pα, Pˆy, Pˆz, Pˆα). Note that F
is continuously differentiable on its domain of definition. Thus, if
[
∂F
∂pi ,
∂F
∂pˆi
]
(pi, pˆi,C) is invertible
for, then, by the implicit function theorem, there exists an open set U containing C and a
continuously differentiable function g : U 7→ (Rnd×d)2 such that for all admissible coefficients
C ∈ U : F (g(C),C) = 0 and the solutions (pi, pˆi) = g(C) are unique. It means that if we find a
solution to (28) while the condition
[
∂F
∂pi ,
∂F
∂pˆi
]
is invertible, then for small perturbations on the
coefficients we still have solutions for (pi, pˆi).
Let us now give sufficient conditions to ensure the existence of (pi, pˆi) in a simplified setting
where the state t → Xt belongs to R and all the players are symmetric in the sense that all
the coefficients associated with each player are equals (b1 = ... = b2, Q1 = ... = Qn, etc.). We
suppose also that the volatility is not controlled i.e. σi = 0 for all i ∈ J1, nK. In such a case
pi, pˆi ∈ Rn×1, pi1 = ... = pin, pˆin = ... = pˆin and the systems (28) of coupled equations now
reduces to two coupled second order equations:pi
2
1 [nb1Sy,1] + pi1
[
−bx + Py,1 + Pz,1σx +
∑
j 6=1 Pα,1,jSy,1 − nb1Sx,1
]
+
∑
j 6=1 Pα,1,jSx,j = 0
pˆi21
[
nbˆ1Sˆy,1
]
+ pˆi1
[
−bˆx + Pˆy,1 +
∑
j 6=1 Pˆα,1,jSˆy,1 − nbˆ1Sˆx,1
]
+
∑
j 6=1 Pˆα,1,jSˆx,j + pi1Pˆz,1σˆx = 0.
If we note: 
a := nb1Sy,1
b := −bx + Py,1 + Pz,1σx +
∑
j 6=1 Pα,1,jSy,1 − nb1Sx,1
c :=
∑
j 6=1 Pα,1,jSx,j ,
then a sufficient condition for pi1 to exists is simply: b2 − 4ac ≥ 0. Since a ≤ 0 and c ≥ 0 we
have two possibilities a priori for pi1. We choose the positive one to ensure that α ∈ A. Then
if we note: 
aˆ := nbˆ1Sˆy,1
bˆ := −bˆx + Pˆy,1 +
∑
j 6=1 Pˆα,1,jSˆy,1 − nbˆ1Sˆx,1
cˆ(pi1) :=
∑
j 6=1 Pˆα,1,jSˆx,j + pi1Pˆz,1σˆx,
a sufficient condition for pˆi1 to exist is bˆ2 − 4aˆcˆ(pi1) ≥ 0. To ensure that there is a positive
solution we also need cˆ(pi1) ≥ 0.
17
(v) Let us finally verify that α? ∈ A. Let us consider the candidate for the optimal control for
each player:
α? −α? = Ax(X −X) +Rt −Rt
α? = AˆxX + Rˆt
where the coefficients are defined in (15) and X? is the state process optimally controlled.
Since R, Rˆ ∈ L2F(Ω × R+,R
∑
i di) and given that the coefficient are constant in the infinite
horizon case, we need to verify that:∫ ∞
0
e−ρuE[|X?u − E[X?u]|2]du <∞
∫ ∞
0
e−ρu|E[X?u]|2du <∞.
As we will see below, we will have to choose ρ large enough to ensure these conditions. From
the above expressions we see that X? satisfies:{
dX?t = b
?
tdt+ σ
?
t dWt
X0 = x0
with:
b?t = β
?
t +B
?(X?t − E[X?t ]) + Bˆ?E[X?t ] σ?t = γ?t + Σ?(X?t − E[X?t ]) + Σˆ?E[X?t ]
where we define
B? = bx +BAx Bˆ
? = bˆx + BˆAˆx Σ
? = σx + ΣAx Σˆ
? = σˆx + ΣˆAˆx
β?t = βt +B(Rt − E[Rt]) + BˆRˆt
γ?t = σt + Σ(Rt − E[Rt]) + ΣˆRˆt.
By Itô’s formula we have:
d
dt
e−ρt|Xt|2 ≤ e−ρt
(
−ρ|X?t |2 + 2(b?t )ᵀX?t
)
≤ e−ρt
(
|X?t |2(−ρ+ 2Bˆ?) + 2|X?t ||β?t |
)
≤ e−ρt
(
|X?t |2(−ρ+ 2Bˆ? + ) +
1

|β?t |2
)
.
If we now set:
K = |E[X?0 ]|2 +
1

∫ ∞
0
e−ρu|β?t |2du C = −ρ+ 2Bˆ? + ,
then, by Grownall inequality we obtain:
e−ρt|E[X?t ]|2 ≤ KeCt.
Therefore, in order to have
∫∞
0 e
−ρu|E[X?u]|2du < ∞, we shall impose that ρ > 2Bˆ?. Finally,
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by Itô’s formula we also have:
d
dt
E[e−ρt|X?t −X?t |2] ≤ e−ρtE
[
−ρ|X?t −Xt?|2 + 2(b?t − bt?)ᵀ(X?t −Xt?) + |σ?t |2
]
≤ e−ρtE
[
|X?t −Xt?|2(−ρ+ 2B? + ) +
1

|β?t − βt?|2
+4(|γ?t |2 + |Σ?|2|X?t − E[X?t ]|2 + |Σˆ?|2|E[X?t ]|2)
]
≤ e−ρtE
[
|X?t −Xt?|2(−ρ+ 2B? + + 4|Σ?|2)+
1

|β?t − βt?|2 + 4(|γ?t |2 + |Σˆ?|2|E[X?t ]|2)
]
.
If we now set:
K = |X?0 −X?0|2 +
∫ ∞
0
e−ρuE
[
1

|β?u − βu?|2 + 4(|γ?u|2 + |Σˆ?|2|E[X?u]|2)
]
du
C = −ρ+ 2B? + 4|Σ?|2 + ,
then, by Grownall inequality we obtain:
e−ρtE
[
|X?t −Xt?|2
]
≤ Ke−Ct.
This time in order to ensure the convergence
∫∞
0 e
−ρuE
[
|X?u −Xu?|2
]
du < ∞, we will add
the constraint ρ > 2B? + 4|Σ?|2. To conclude, in order to ensure that α? ∈ A we make the
following assumption:
(H5’) ρ > max
[
2Bˆ?, 2B? + 4|Σ?|2
]
.
3.2 The case of common noise
Let W and W 0 be two independent Brownian motions defined on the same probability space
(Ω,F,F,P) where F = {Ft}t∈[0,T ] is the filtration generated by the pair (W,W 0). Let F0 = {F0t }t∈[0,T ]
be the filtration generated by W 0. For any X0 and α ∈ A as in Section 1, the controlled process
Xα is defined by:
dXt = b(t,X
α
t ,E[X
α
t |W 0],αt,E[αt|W 0])dt +σ(t,Xαt ,E[Xαt |W 0],αt,E[αt|W 0])dWt
+σ0(t,Xαt ,E[X
α
t |W 0],αt,E[αt|W 0])dW 0t
Xα0 = X0
where for each t ∈ [0, T ], x, x ∈ Rd, ai, ai ∈ Rdi :
b(t, x, x,α,α) = βt + bx,tx+ b˜x,tx+
∑n
i=1 bi,tαi + b˜i,tαi
= βt + bx,tx+ b˜x,tx+Btα+ B˜tα
σ(t, x, x,α,α) = γt + σx,tx+ σ˜x,tx+
∑n
i=1 σi,tαi + σ˜i,tαi
= γt + σx,tx+ σ˜x,tx+ Σtα+ Σ˜tα
σ(t, x, x,α,α) = γ0t + σ
0
x,tx+ σ˜
0
x,tx+
∑n
i=1 σ
0
i,tαi + σ˜
0
i,tαi
= γ0t + σ
0
x,tx+ σ˜
0
x,tx+ Σ
0
tα+ Σ˜
0
tα.
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Since we will condition onW 0, we assume that the coefficients bx, b˜x, bi, b˜i, σx, σ˜x, σi, σ˜i, σ0x, σ˜0x, σ0i , σ˜
0
i
are essentially bounded and F0-adapted processes, whereas β, γ, γ0 are square integrable F0-adapted
processes. The problem of each player i is to minimize over αi ∈ Ai, and given control α−i of the
other players, a cost functional of the form
J i(αi, α
−i) = E
[∫ T
0
e−ρtf i(Xαt ,E[X
α
t |W 0t ],αt,E[αt|W 0t ])dt+ e−ρT gi(XαT ,E[XαT |W 0T ])
]
with f i, gi as in (3). We now suppose that Qi, Q˜i, Ii, I˜i, N i, N˜ i are essentially bounded and F0-
adapted, Lix, Lik are square-integrable F-adapted processes, P
i, P˜ i are essentially bounded F0T -
mesurable random variable and ri are square-integrable FT -mesurable random variable. Hypoth-
esis c) and d) of (H2) still holds. As in step 1 we guess a random field of the type Wα,it =
wit(X
α
t ,E
[
Xαt |W 0t
]
) where wi is of the form wit(x, x) = Kit .(x − x)⊗2 + Λit.x⊗2 + 2Y iᵀt x + Rit with
suitable coefficients Ki,Λi, Y i, Ri. Given that the quadratic coefficient in f i, gi are F0-adapted we
guess that Ki,Λi are also F0-adapted. Since the linear coefficients in f i, gi and the affine coefficients
in b, σ, σ0 are F-adapted, we guess that Y i is F-adapted as well. Thus for each player we look for
processes (Ki,Λi, Y i, Ri) valued in Sd+ × Sd+ × Rd × R and of the form:
dKit = K˙
i
tdt+ Z
Ki
t dW
0
t K
i
T = P
i
dΛit = Λ˙
i
tdt+ Z
Λi
t dW
0
t Λ
i
T = P
i + P˜ i
dY it = Y˙
i
t dt+ Z
i
tdWt + Z
0,Y i
t dW
0
t Y
i
T = r
i
dRit = R˙
i
tdt R
i
T = 0
where K˙i, Λ˙i, ZKi , ZΛi are F0-adapted processes valued in Sd; Y˙ i, ZY i , Z0,Y i are F-adapted processes
valued in Rd and Ri are continuous functions valued in R. In step 2 we now consider, for each player
i ∈ J1, nK, a family of processes of the form:
S
α,i
t = e
−ρtwit(X
α
t ,E
[
Xαt |W 0t
]
) +
∫ t
0
e−ρuf i(u,Xαu ,E
[
Xαu |W 0u
]
,αu,E
[
αu|W 0u
]
)du.
By Itô’s formula we then obtain for (5) and (6):
Φit = Q
i
t + σ
ᵀ
x,tK
i
tσx,t + σ
0ᵀ
t K
i
tσ
0
t +K
i
tbx,t + b
ᵀ
x,tK
i
t + Z
Ki
t σ
0
x,t + σ
0ᵀ
x,tZ
Ki
t − ρKit
Ψit = Qˆ
i
t + σˆ
ᵀ
x,tK
i
t σˆx,t + σˆ
0ᵀ
x,tΛ
i
tσˆ
0
x,t + Λ
i
tbˆx,t + bˆ
ᵀ
x,tΛ
i
t + Z
Λi
t σˆ
0
x,t + σˆ
0ᵀ
x,tZ
Λi
t − ρΛit
∆it = L
i
x,t + b
ᵀ
x,tY
i
t + b˜
ᵀ
x,tY
i
t + σ
ᵀ
x,tZ
i
t + σ˜
ᵀ
x,tZ
i
t + σ
0ᵀ
x,tZ
0,Y i
t + σ˜
0ᵀ
x,tZ
0,Y i
t + Λ
i
tβt
+σᵀx,tK
i
tγt + σ˜
ᵀ
x,tK
i
tγt +K
i
t(βt − βt) + ZK
i
t (γ
0
t − γ0t ) + ZΛ
i
t γ
0
t − ρY it
+
∑
k 6=i U
iᵀ
k,t(αk,t − αk,t) + V iᵀk,tαk,t
Γit = γ
ᵀ
tK
i
tγt + γ
0ᵀ
t Λ
i
tγ
0
t + (γ
0
t − γ0t )ᵀKit(γ0t − γ0t ) + 2βᵀt Y it + 2γᵀt Zit + 2γ0ᵀt Z0,Y
i
t
+
∑
k 6=i(αk,t − αk,t)ᵀSik,t(αk,t − αk,t) + αᵀk,tSˆik,tαk,t + 2[Oik,t + ξik,t − ξ
i
k,t]
ᵀαk,t − ρRit,
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with 
Sik,t = N
i
k,t + σ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
tσk,t + (σ
0
k,t)
ᵀKitσ
0
k,t
Sˆik,t = Nˆ
i
k,t + σˆ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
t σˆk,t + (σˆ
0
k,t)
ᵀΛitσˆ
0
k,t
U ik,t = I
i
k,t + σ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
tσx,t + (σ
0
k,t)
ᵀKitσ
0
x,t + (σ
0
k,t)
ᵀZK
i
t + b
ᵀ
k,tK
i
t
V ik,t = Iˆ
i
k,t + σˆ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
t σˆx,t + (σˆ
0
k,t)
ᵀΛitσˆ
0
x,t + (σˆ
0
k,t)
ᵀZΛ
i
t + bˆ
ᵀ
k,tΛ
i
t
Oik,t = L
i
k,t + bˆ
ᵀ
k,tY
i
t + σˆ
ᵀ
k,tZ
i
t + σˆ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
tγt + (σˆ
0
k,t)
ᵀΛitγ
0
t + (σˆ
0
k,t)
ᵀZ0,Y
i
t
+12
∑
k 6=i(Jˆ
i
i,k,t + Jˆ
iᵀ
k,i,t)αk,t
J ik,l,t = G
i
k,l,t + σ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
tσl,t + (σ
0
k,t)
ᵀKitσ
0
l,t
Jˆ ik,l,t = Gˆ
i
k,l,t + σˆ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
t σˆl,t + (σˆ
0
k,t)
ᵀΛitσˆ
0
l,t
ξik,t = L
i
k,t + b
ᵀ
k,tY
i
t + σ
ᵀ
k,tZ
i
t + (σ
0
k,t)
ᵀZ0,Y
i
t + σ
ᵀ
k,tK
i
tγt + (σ
0
k,t)
ᵀKitγ
0
t
+12
∑
k 6=i(J
i
i,k,t + J
iᵀ
k,i,t)αk,t.
Note that we now denote by U the conditional expectation with respect to W 0t , i.e. U = E
[
U |W 0t
]
.
Then, at step 3, we constraint the coefficients (Ki,Λi, Y i, Ri) to satisfy the following problem:
dKit = −Φi0t dt+ ZK
i
t dW
0
t K
i
T = P
i
dΛit = −Ψi0t dt+ ZΛ
i
t dW
0
t Λ
i
T = P
i + P˜ i
dY it = −∆i0t dt+ +ZitdWt + Z0,Y
i
t dW
0
t Y
i
T = r
i
dRit = −Γi0t dt RiT = 0
(29)
where Φi0,Ψi0,∆i0,Γi0 are defined in (8). Thus we obtain the best response functions of the players:
αi,t = −Si−1i,t U ii,t(Xt − E[Xt|W 0t ])− Si−1i,t (ξii,t − ξ
i
i,t)− Sˆi−1i,t (V ii,tE[Xt|W 0t ] +Oii,t).
We then proceed to step 5 and to the search of a fixed point in the space of controls. The
only difference at that point is in the ansatz for t 7→ Yt. Since we consider the case of common
noise, we now search for an ansatz of the form Y t = pit(Xt − Xt) + pˆitXt + ηt where (pi, pˆi, η) ∈
L∞([0, T ],Rnd×d)× L∞([0, T ],Rnd×d)× S2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rnd) satisfy:
dηt = ψtdt+ φtdWt + φ
0
tdW
0
t
ηT = r = (r
i)i∈J1,nK
dpit = p˙itdt+ Z
0,pii
t dW
0
t
piT = 0
dpˆit = ˙ˆpitdt+ Z
0,pˆii
t dW
0
t
pˆiT = 0.
(30)
The method to determine the coefficients is then similar. Existence and uniqueness of a solution
(Ki,Λi) to the backward stochastic Ricatti equation in (29) is discussed in [13], section 3.2. The
existence of a solution (Y i, Zi, Z0,Y i) to the linear mean-field BSDE in (29) is obtained as in step
6 thanks to Thm. 2.1 in [12]. As in the previous section the existence of a soltion (pi, pˆi) ∈ L∞F0(Ω×
R+,Rnd×d) (essentially bounded F0-adapted functions) of (30) in the general case is a conjecture
and needs to be verified in each example. We are not aware of any work tackling the existence of
solutions in such situation. Given (pi, pˆi) the existence of (η, φ, φ0) solution to (30) is ensured as in
the previous section by Thm. 2.1 in [12].
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3.3 The case of multiple Brownian motions
We quickly sketch an extension to the case where there are multiple Brownian motions driving the
state equation. The assumptions on the coefficients are the same as in the previous part. Only the
length of the calculus changes. Let us now consider the state dynamic:
dXt = b(t,X
α
t ,E [X
α
t ] ,αt,E [αt])dt+
κ∑
`=1
σ`(t,Xαt ,E [X
α
t ] ,αt,E [αt])dW
`
t
where Φi0,Ψi0,∆i0,Γi0t are defined in (8).
αt = (α1,t, ..., αn,t)
b(t, x, x,a,a) = βt + bx,tx+ b˜x,tx+
∑n
i=1 bi,tai,t + b˜i,tai,t
σ`(t, x, x,a,a) = γ`t + σ
`
x,tx+ σ˜
`
x,tx+
∑n
i=1 σ
`
i,tαi,t + σ˜
`
i,tαi,t.
(31)
We require the coefficients in (31) to satisfy an adaptation of (H1) where γ, σx, σ˜x, (σi, σ˜i)i∈J1,nK are
replaced by γ`, σ`x, σ˜`x, (σ`i , σ˜
`
i )i∈J1,nK for ` ∈ {1, ..., κ}.
To take into account the multiple Brownian motions in step 1, we now search for random fields of
the form wit(x, x) = Kit .(x−x)⊗2+Λit.x⊗2+2Y iᵀt x+Rit with the processes (Ki,Λi, Y i, (Z`,i)`∈J1,κK, Ri)
in (L∞([0, T ],Sd+))2×, S2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rd)× (L2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rd))κ × L∞([0, T ],R) and solution to:
dKit = K˙
i
tdt K
i
T = P
i
dΛit = Λ˙
i
tdt Λ
i
T = P
i + P˜ i
dY it = Y˙
i
t dt+
∑
` Z
i,`
t dW
`
t Y
i
T = r
i
dRit = R˙
i
tdt R
i
T = 0
where (K˙i, Λ˙i, R˙i) are deterministic processes valued in Sd+ × Sd+ × R and (Y˙ i, Zi) are adapted
processes valued in Rd.
The method then follows the same steps with generalized coefficients and at step 2 we obtain
generalized coefficient for (5) and (6):
Φit = Q
i
t +K
i
tbx,t + b
ᵀ
x,tK
i
t +
∑
r σ
rᵀ
x,tK
i
tσ
r
x,t − ρKit
Ψit = Qˆ
i
t + Λ
i
tbˆx,t + bˆ
ᵀ
x,tΛ
i
t +
∑
r σˆ
rᵀ
x,tΛ
i
tσˆ
r
x,t − ρΛit
∆it = L
i
x,t + b
ᵀ
x,tY
i
t + b˜
ᵀ
x,tY
i
t + Λ
i
tβt +K
i
t(βt − βt)
+
∑
` σ
`ᵀ
x,tK
i
tγ
`
t + σ˜
`ᵀ
x,tK
i
tγ
`
t + σ
`ᵀ
x,tZ
i,`
t + σ˜
`ᵀ
x,tZ
i,`
t − ρY it
+
∑
k 6=i U
i
k,t(αk,t − αk,t) + V ik,tαk,t
Γit = 2β
ᵀ
t Y
i
t +
∑
` γ
`ᵀ
t K
i
tγ
`
t + 2γ
`ᵀ
t Z
i,`
t
+
∑
k 6=i(αk,t − αk,t)ᵀSik,t(αk,t − αk,t) + αᵀk,tSˆik,tαk,t + 2[Oik,t + ξik,t − ξ
i
k,t]
ᵀαk,t
(32)

Sik,t = N
i
k,t +
∑
` σ
`ᵀ
k,tK
i
tσ
`
k,t
Sˆik,t = Nˆ
i
k,t +
∑
` σˆ
`ᵀ
k,tK
i
t σˆ
`
k,t
U ik,t = I
i
k,t + b
ᵀ
k,tK
i
t +
∑
` σ
`ᵀ
k,tK
i
tσ
`
x,t
V ik,t = Iˆ
i
k,t + bˆ
ᵀ
k,tΛ
i
t +
∑
` σˆ
`ᵀ
k,tK
i
t σˆ
`
x,t
Oik,t = L
i
k,t + bˆ
ᵀ
k,tY
i
t +
∑
` σˆ
`ᵀ
k,tZ
i,`
t + σˆ
`ᵀ
k,tK
i
tγ
`
t
J ik,l,t = G
i
k,l,t +
∑
` σ
`ᵀ
k,tK
i
tσ
`
l,t
Jˆ ik,l,t = Gˆ
i
k,l,t +
∑
` σˆ
`ᵀ
k,tK
i
t σˆ
`
l,t
ξik,t = L
i
k,t + b
ᵀ
k,tY
i
t +
∑
` σ
`ᵀ
k,tZ
i,`
t + σ
`ᵀ
k,tK
i
tγ
`
t .
(33)
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From these extended formulas we can then constrain the coefficients as in step 3 and obtain (8)
with now the generalized coefficients defined in (32) and (33). The step 4 is then straightforward
and we obtain the best response functions:
αi,t = a
i,0
t (Xt,E[Xt]) + a
i,1
t (E[Xt])
= −(Sii,t)−1U ii,t(Xt − E[Xt])− (Sii,t)−1(ξii,t − ξii,t)− (Sˆii,t)−1(V ii,tE[Xt] +Oii,t).
From step 4 we can then continue to step 5, i.e. the fixed point search. The only difference
at that point is in the ansatz fort 7→ Yt. Since we consider the case with multiple Brownian
motions we now search for an ansatz of the form Y t = pit(Xt −Xt) + pˆitXt + ηt where (pi, pˆi, η) ∈
L∞([0, T ],Rnd×d)× L∞([0, T ],Rnd×d)× S2F(Ω× [0, T ],Rnd) satisfy:
dηt = ψtdt+
∑
` φ
`
tdW
`
t
ηT = r = (r
i)i∈J1,nK
dpit = p˙itdt
piT = 0
dpˆit = ˙ˆpitdt
pˆiT = 0.
The method to determine the coefficients pi, pˆi, η is then similar. The validity of the computations
i.e. Step 6 can be done exactly as in the case of a single brownian motion.
4 Example
We now focus on a toy example to illustrate the previous results. Let us consider a two player game
where the state dynamics is simply a Brownian motion that two players can control. The goal of
each player is to get the state near its own target t 7→ T it , where t 7→ T it , i = 1, 2, is a stochastic
process. In order to add mean-field terms we suppose that each player try also to minimize the
variance of the state and the variance of their controls.{
dXt = (b1α1,t + b2α2,t)dt+ σdWt
J i(α1, α2) = E
[∫∞
0 e
−ρu
(
λiVar(Xu) + δ
i(Xu − T iu)2 + θiVar(αi,u) + ξiα2i,u
)
du
]
, i = 1, 2,
where (λi, δi, θi, ξi) ∈ R4+. In order to fit to the context described in the first section we rewrite the
cost function as follows:
J i(α1, α2) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρu
(
(λi + δi)(Xu −Xu)2 + δiX2u + (θi + ξ)2(αi,u − αi,u)
+ ξiα2i,u + 2Xu[−2δiT i] + δi(T iu)2
)
du
]
.
Since the terms δi(T i)2 do not influence the optimal control of the players, we work with the slightly
simplified cost function:
J˜ i(α1, α2) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρu
(
(λi + δi)(Xu −Xu)2 + δiX2u + (θi + ξ)2(αi,u − αi,u) + ξiα2i,u + 2Xu[−2δiT i]
)
du
]
.
Following the method explained in the previous section, we use Theorem 2.3 in order to find a
Nash equilibrium. We obtain the feedback form of the open loop controls and the dynamics of the
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state: 
αi − αi = −P ibi
(
(Ki + pii)(Xt −Xt) + ηit − ηit
)
αi = − P˜ ibi
(
(Λi + p˜ii)Xt + η
i
t
)
Xt = X0e
−a˜t +
∫ t
0 e
−a˜(t−u)γudu
Xt −Xt = (X0 −X0)e−at +
∫ t
0 e
−a(t−u) [(γu − γu)du+ σdWu]
(34)
where Ki ∈ R+,Λi ∈ R+, a ∈ R, a˜ ∈ R, pi ∈ R2, p˜i ∈ R2, η ∈ L2F((0,∞),R2), γ ∈ L2F((0,∞),R2) satisfy:

Ki =
−ρ+
√
ρ2+4P i(λi+δi)
2P i
Λi =
−ρ+
√
ρ2+4P˜ iδi
2P˜ i
a =
∑2
i=1 P
i(Ki + pii)
a˜ =
∑2
i=1 P˜
i(Λi + p˜ii)
0 = Pypi − (piB − Pα)(Sx + Sypi)
0 = P˜yp˜i − (p˜iB − P˜α)(S˜x + S˜yp˜i)
ηt − ηt = −
∫∞
t e
[Py−(piB−Pα)Sy ](t−u)E
[
Hu −Hu|Ft
]
du
ηt = −
∫∞
t e
[P˜y−(p˜iB−P˜α)S˜y ](t−u)Hudu
γt − γt = −
∑2
i=1 P
i(ηi,t − ηi,t)
γt = −
∑2
i=1 P˜
iηi,t

Sx = −(P 1K1/b1, P 2K2/b2)
S˜x = −(P˜ 1Λ1/b1, P˜ 2Λ2/b2)
Sy = −(1i=jP i/bi)i,j∈{1,2}
S˜y = −(1i=jP˜ i/bi)i,j∈{1,2}
Pα = −(1i 6=jKibj)i,j∈{1,2}
P˜α = −(1i 6=jΛibj)i,j∈{1,2}
Py = (1i=j(P
iKi + ρ))i,j∈{1,2}
P˜y = (1i=j(P˜
iΛi + ρ))i,j∈{1,2}
H = (δ1T 1, δ2T 2)
B = (b1, b2)
P i =
b2i
θi+ξi
P˜ i =
b2i
ξi
.
(35)
From (34) and (35) we can study and simulate the influence of the different parameters of the
cost-function of the first player. We notice that (λ1, θ1) only influence X − E [X] and the feedback
form of α1 − α1 (zero-mean terms).
• If λ1 →∞ then pi1 ∼ λ1 and K1 →∞ which implies that Xt − E [X]t → 0 for all t ≥ 0. This
is expected since the term λ1 penalizes the variance of the state Var(Xt) in the cost function
of the first player. See Figure 1.
• If δ1 →∞ then (pi, p˜i)→∞ and K1 ∼ δ1 and Λ1 ∼ δ1 which imply that Xt → T 1t for all t ≥ 0.
This is also expected since the term δ1 penalizes the quadratic gap between the state X and
the target T 1. See Figure 2.
• If θ1 →∞ then P 1 → 0, P 1K1 → 0, P 1pi1 → 0 and P 1η1t → 0 for every t ≥ 0. We then have
αt − αt → 0 for all t ≥ 0 and all the terms relative to the first player in X − E [X] disappear.
Given that θ1 penalizes the variance of the control of the first player, this convergence is also
intuitive.
• If ξ1 →∞ then (P 1, P˜ 1)→ 0 which imply that (α1,t, α1,t)→ 0 for all t ≥ 0 and all the terms
relative to the first player in Xt − E [Xt] and E [Xt] disappear for all t ≥ 0. This means that
the first player becomes powerless.
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(a) λi = 0 (b) λi = 10
(c) λi = 100 (d) λi = 500
Figure 1: Nash equilibrium with:
bi = σ = δ
i = θi = ξi = 1, ρ = 3, T 1 = 0, T 2 = 10
Figure 2: t 7→ E[Xt]
bi = σ = δ
i = θi = ξi = 1, ρ = 3, T 1 = 0, T 2 = 10
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